Page 11 - Housing & Poverty In Malta With A Focus On The Southern Harbour Region
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consumers  to  splurge,  also  affect  inflation.  Indeed,  the  RPI  is  a  flawed  measure  of
                   inflation.

                      “Ideally, an effective measure should include not only the prices of goods and services consumed
                      today, but also of those to be consumed tomorrow, since they, too, affect the value of money. Assets
                      are claims on future services, so assets are a proxy for the prices of future consumption.”
                                                                                              15

                   The RPI seems to have underestimated true inflation repeatedly in the past, and this
                   inevitably adversely affects housing affordability. What is more, it also adversely affected
                   landlords renting property under the rent laws’ restrictions, since the allowable increases
                   were RPI-based (Mallia, 2003).


                   What is more, the price level of both houses and flats was consistently higher in the
                   Sliema/  St.  Julian’s  area,  with  the  difference  widening  progressively  with  time.  The
                   difference in prices of terraced houses over space narrowed slightly between 1980 and
                   1993, but widened again thereafter.


                   In 1990, the price of a flat in the Sliema/ St. Julian’s area was estimated to be 50% the
                   price of a terraced house, whereas that for a flat in the Southern Area was estimated at
                   40%. The Sliema/ St. Julian’s area was also found to be strongly preferred by foreign
                   buyers, who perhaps end up crowding out the lower-earning Maltese workers.

                   House prices also rose in absolute terms and in relation to incomes. According to Demarco
                   (1995), this is due to the fact that in 1987 a wage freeze which was then in force was
                   abolished, with the result that unemployment declined and incomes rose. These factors,
                   in turn, paved the way for an unrelenting rise in house pricing. A very sharp rise was
                   registered  in  1994.  We  found  such  an  analysis  to  be  very  suspect  though,  since  the
                   abolition of the wage freeze should, in theory, have resulted in increased unemployment
                   levels. To the contrary of Mr. Demarco, we believe that the fall in unemployment, the rise
                   in  the  general  level  of  wages  and,  by  implication,  the  soaring  house  prices  lie  in
                   institutional factors that reinvigorated the Maltese economy and that fuelled a wave of
                   speculation that will only last when such speculation can no longer be sustained by real
                   economic activity and the market will have no option but to correct itself. In other words,
                   while agreeing with Demarco’s analysis of effects, we disagree with his causal analysis.

                   By the end of 1994, flats siphoned off 370% of average disposable income, which means
                   that the average Maltese worker had to work for 3.7 years and allocate all his earnings to
                   paying off his loan in order to pay back a housing loan. Terraced houses siphoned off 810%
                   of average disposable income, which by the same token, translates into an individual
                   working for 8.1 years exclusively for the house loan needed to finance the purchasing of
                   the house.


                   The key factors affecting the Maltese housing market (Demarco, 1995) are:



                                                                       rd
                   15  “Hubble, bubble, asset-price trouble” : The Economist (Sep 23  1999).



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